Summary. This paper describes conditions under which one investment project dominates a second project in terms of net present value, irrespective of the choice of the discount rate. The resulting partial ordering of projects has certain similarities to stochastic dominance. However, the structure of the net present value function leads to characterizations that are quite specific to this context. Our theorems use Bernstein's (1915) innovative results on the representation and approximation of polynomials, as well as other general results from the theory of equations, to characterize the partial ordering. We also show how the ranking is altered when the range of discount rates is limited or the rate varies period by period. JEL Classification Numbers: D92, G31, H043, O22.
Introduction
Most public or private investment projects entail a significant up-front investment with a stream of returns over many subsequent periods. The traditional way of reckoning the economic viability of such a project is to use a discount rate to convert future earnings into present values, which are then weighed against initial
We thank Robert Driskill, Andrea Maneschi, Roy Radner, and participants of seminars at NYU, Notre Dame, Purdue, and Washington University for helpful comments. The present version of the paper has benefited from comments by a referee and the editor. Foster is grateful for support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation through its network on Inequality and Poverty in Broader Perspective. Correspondence to: T. Mitra cost to obtain the discounted present value of the project. The choice of discount rate is crucial. If it is low enough, future earnings will essentially receive full weight, which entails a positive present value for the typical project. At higher discount rates, future earnings receive less importance, and the present value falls into the negative range. Clearly, the acceptability of a given project can be sensitive to the specific rate chosen.
The discount rate is no less critical when comparing two competing (mutually exclusive) investment projects. If one project a entails both a smaller initial investment and lower returns down the road than another project b, then a higher discount rate will tend to favor project a due to its smaller initial investment, while a lower rate will favor b's higher returns over time. In other words, the difference in present values of the two projects is the same as the present value of the stream of differences in returns; and since this stream is initially negative (as b has higher initial investment) and subsequently positive (as b has higher returns), the present value of the differences is positive or negative depending on the discount rate. The relative ranking of two projects can be sensitive to the chosen rate. Now, how easy is it to select an appropriate discount rate? For private investment projects, this selection is in theory straightforward, since it can be based on an observable market rate of interest facing the firm or individual.
2 On the other hand, public projects are evaluated using a social rate of discount, which is considerably more difficult to ascertain. Indeed, there is an extensive and varied literature addressing the question of finding the right social discount rate.
3 And while there may be general agreement that the social discount rate is not just a market rate, there is substantially less agreement on exactly how it should be determined. It should come as no surprise that, in the absence of a generally accepted method for determining the social discount rate, a wide range of rates can often be observed in actual use. 4 This calls into question the robustness of comparisons that involve only a single discount rate.
The present paper asks: When does one project unambiguously dominate another in the sense that it has a higher present value at all discount rates? To be sure, any projects a and b for which a has uniformly lower costs and higher returns than b could be so ranked. 5 But, in fact, the possibilities for unambiguous ranking go well beyond simple period-by-period dominance. Consider a comparison of Project a, costing $10 million and yielding $5 million after one year and $8 million after two, and Project b, costing $12 million with respective returns of $10 million and $3
